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Abstract
We investigate the accuracy of UPP as a tool in antitrust analysis when there are cost effi-
ciencies from a horizontal merger. We include merger-specific cost efficiencies in a tractable
manner in the model and extend the standard UPP formulation to account for these efficien-
cies. The efficacy of the new UPP formulations is analyzed using Monte Carlo simulation of
40,000 mergers (8 scenarios, 5,000 mergers in each scenario). We find that the new UPP
formulations yield substantial gains in prediction of post-merger prices, and there are sub-
stantial gains in merger screening accuracy as well. Moreover, the new UPP formulations
outperform the standard UPP formulation at higher thresholds for all the standard cases
in the paper. The results are robust to several additional analyses. The results show that
including cost efficiencies in a manner guided by the theoretical model may yield substantial
improvements in accuracy of UPP as a tool in antitrust analysis.
Introduction
A central tenet in antitrust policy is that antitrust agencies want to block mergers that are anti-
competitive without interfering with ones that are procompetitive. Antitrust agencies spend
considerable time, effort, and resources to determine the impact a merger may have on the
post-merger competitive landscape.
Standard approaches focus on well-developed tools such as the Herfindahl Hirschman
Index (HHI) and full-merger simulations. More recently, Upward Pricing Pressure (UPP),
proposed by [1], is being used as a pre-merger screening tool to estimate anticompetitive
effects in horizontal mergers. UPP is now included in the U.S. Department of Justice and the
Federal Trade Commission Horizontal Merger Guidelines (2010) and used increasingly world-
wide—The United Kingdom (2010) incorporates UPP to their horizontal merger assessment
guidelines, §§5.4.6–5.4.11, highlighting the need to associate its analysis with price sensitivity
of consumers through own and cross-price elasticities; In France (2013), as expressed in Les
lignes directrices relatives au contrôle des concentrations V.D.2.c.(405-420), not only is UPP
adopted, it highlights the need for proper efficiency estimates jointly with it; Brazil (2016) in
Guia Análise de Atos de Concentração Horizontal §2.5.2. shows that the likelihood of harm
from mergers with heterogeneous goods arises from the proximity of substitution (diversion).
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UPP measures the first impulse for a merged firm to raise prices. It is derived by comparing
the first-order condition of the merged firm with that of the pre-merger firm. The standard
formulation is as follows. Suppose firms i and j merge. Upward pricing pressure (for the good
produced by firm i) is given by UPPi = Dij(Pj − MCj). Here Dij is the diversion matrix, which
measures proportion of sales lost by firm i that are recaptured by firm j, and (Pj − MCj) is the
margin for firm j. Both are computed at pre-merger values.
The UPP computation has several benefits. It uses information about merging firms only,
not other firms in the industry, and therefore, market shares of other firms are not needed.
This simplifies its computation. Moreover, it is relatively quick and easy to implement,
requires less information than some other measures, and is theoretically grounded.
The UPP computation provides a good measure of the first impulse to raise prices from a
merger. Notably, it does not predict post-merger prices or provide an estimate of accuracy of
price prediction. Moreover, its standard application does not include cost efficiencies from a
merger. When the UPP calculation is high, merging parties argue with antitrust agencies that
the UPP calculation should be lowered, because there are cost efficiencies from the merger,
but antitrust agencies argue for more realistic numbers and require additional justification.
Current practice is to arrive at some reduction to the UPP calculation to account for cost effi-
ciencies. The relation of the magnitude of this reduction to more fundamental principles is
typically left unexplored.
Using the theoretical framework in [2], we include cost efficiencies in a tractable manner
and derive the related UPP formulations.
The efficacy of the new UPP formulations is analyzed using Monte Carlo simulation for a
variety of scenarios: Four demand systems (Logit, Linear, Loglinear, and Almost ideal), two
merger-specific, cost complementarity systems (Generalized Leontief and Quadratic), and a
total of 40,000 mergers (8 scenarios, 5,000 mergers in each scenario). For each merger, we
compute several measures of UPP (including standard and new), compute post-merger equi-
librium, and compute effectiveness of UPP in terms of price-prediction accuracy and merger
screening accuracy.
We find that with inclusion of merger-specific cost efficiencies and using a more accurate
first order approximation to compute UPP, there are substantial gains in prediction of post-
merger equilibrium prices. In seven of eight scenarios, UPP based price predictions are within
3 percent of post-merger equilibrium prices at the median, both in absolute and relative terms.
(In five scenarios, these are within 0.25 percent.)
Similarly, we find that with the new UPP measures, there are substantial gains in merger
screening accuracy. In six of eight scenarios, UPP based merger screens (at 5% price increase
threshold) reduce total probability of false positives (flagging a merger for scrutiny incorrectly)
and false negatives (letting a merger go through incorrectly) to less than 0.02. (In four scenar-
ios, this is 0.007 or less.)
Finally, to provide a stricter comparison to existing practice, we compare the standard UPP
formulation with higher thresholds (of 5%, 10%, and 15% price increase) to the new UPP mea-
sures with a 0% threshold. In every scenario, total probability of false positives and negatives
is lower for the new UPP measures, and in most cases, there is a large reduction in the total
error. The results are robust to several additional analyses, including using F1 score and allow-
ing for more flexible merger-specific efficiencies.
Our results support the continuing use of UPP as a tool in antitrust analysis. Effectiveness
and accuracy of UPP increase greatly when merger-specific efficiencies are included in a
manner guided by the theoretical model. Indeed, UPP calculations may sometimes be a
good substitute for full merger simulations. As UPP provides a conceptual framework
that is sometimes easier to explain to a broader audience of antitrust practitioners and legal
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professionals, and it may be less expensive to implement, this would increase its usefulness
to practitioners as well.
The paper proceeds as follows. The next section includes a literature review. Section 3
details the theoretical framework and formulates different measures of UPP used in the analy-
sis. Section 4 describes the Monte Carlo simulations and data generating process. Section 5
presents the results and analysis. Section 6 concludes.
Literature review
“Antitrust is generally viewed as a public policy aimed at fostering a public good: that is, com-
petition” [3, p. xviii]. Competition agencies ought to provide effective and timely evaluations of
potential pro- and anti-competitive effects of proposed mergers. In the United States, Section
7 of the Clayton Act is the principal federal substantive law governing mergers, acquisitions,
and joint ventures, and which deems unlawful the acquisition of a firm or its stocks such that
“the effect of such acquisition may be substantially to lessen competition, or to tend to create a
monopoly.” Despite the clarity of the established goal, in reality things may not be as straight-
forward. Determining ex ante whether a merger will generate anticompetitive effects if allowed
to go through requires a fair amount of analysis—theoretical, empirical, and institutional.
Whenever screening potential mergers, the antitrust agencies attempt to disentangle and
evaluate two potential sources of anticompetitive effects: unilateral and coordinated [4, 5].
Unilateral effects arise whenever a newly merged firm engages in decision-making strategies
characteristic of higher market power (in terms of ability to restrict output and price above
the competitive level) due to consolidation. Coordinated effects, on the other hand, focus on
changes in likelihood of collusion, either express or tacit, within a market due to consolidation
—This change may manifest itself by the elimination of a maverick (i.e. a firm that seems to be
a natural disruptor of tacit collusion, by constantly setting lower prices for example) or by sim-
ply reducing the number of players and facilitating that a collusive equilibrium might occur.
This paper focuses on unilateral effects, specifically those measuring incentive of consolidated
firm to raise prices post-merger.
Since the development of the first merger guidelines in the United States in 1968 until its
latest version in 2010, the focus has been to identify and guide the processes by which potential
anticompetitive effects may arise. [6] reviews the main points of evolution and change over
time, and highlights what has been learned in these four decades with respect to merger analy-
sis. An overall trend is the shift in focus from narrower market concentration concerns to anti-
competitive effects evaluated more holistically.
Market concentration methods such as HHI continue to retain a prominent position in
antitrust analysis. A well-known limitation of HHI or any other market-share based index for
merger screening is the difficulty of market definition for natural competitors of differentiated
goods [7–9]. This has fueled demand for alternative measures of anticompetitive effects arising
from a merger.
Full merger simulations, an application of formal structural game-theoretical models to
determine and predict unilateral anticompetitive effects, are expensive, time consuming, and
depend on strong assumptions, prior beliefs, and available data [10–12]. [13] test the accuracy
of merger simulation and examine potential sources of differences in the simulated and
directly estimated price effect. A substantial source of these differences is estimated to be
changes in the cost structure—either a reduction or a slight augmentation in marginal costs.
[14] show that a merger simulation represents a major improvement due to its technical
potential, nevertheless it should still be combined with alternative instruments of competition
policy.
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Due to the costly nature of full-merger simulations, it is useful to have alternative merger
screening tools that are less expensive, quick, reliable, and theoretically grounded. UPP is
being used increasingly in this regard as a pre-merger screening tool for horizontal mergers
(e.g., E.I. du Pont de Nemours & Co., 353 U.S. at 592, City of NY v. Group Health Incorp., 649
F.3d 151 (2d Cir. 2011), FTC v. Lundbeck, Inc., 650 F.3d 1236 (8th Cir. Aug 19, 2011)).
UPP and first order approximation
[1] develop upward pricing pressure as an index of likely unilateral effects from a merger, mea-
sured in monetary value of price increase resulting from a merger of horizontal competitors
with partially differentiated goods. UPP indicates existence and strength of unilateral anticom-
petitive effects through an incentive to increase price of the goods produced by a merged firm.
UPP doesn’t claim to provide the exact amount that the merged firm will raise prices in post-
merger equilibrium, but rather provides a measure of the initial incentive to do so, holding
fixed other economic environment parameters, such as price and level of output of other
firms, demand determinants, and so on. Therefore once the market re-equilibrates to a new
post-merger equilibrium, the actual change in prices may be different from a change in first
response.
This difference between first impulse to raise prices and post-merger equilibrium prices has
been a source of debate in the literature. [15] prefer measures that predict post-merger equilib-
rium prices accurately, saying “hill’s height is unrelated to how steep the hill is at its base.” [16]
point out that the first impulse has important information about final post-merger prices,
saying “a ball that is kicked harder might not travel further [. . .] but as a general matter hard-
kicked balls tend to go further.”
[17] proposes a first-order approximation approach as an alternative to functional form
simulation. [2] generalize the first-order approximation approach and show that it can be
used to derive and improve the theoretical formulation of UPP. In particular, including a
demand pass-through matrix makes the UPP computation more theoretically accurate as a
first-impulse to raise prices. Their approach includes multi-product firms and is independent
of particular functional forms for demand or costs. [18] investigates UPP computations in dif-
ferent directions, including how to consider pricing pressures in a merger that may alter the
quality of products of merging firms. [19] study unilateral pricing incentives in vertical merg-
ers taking under consideration cost efficiencies both upstream and downstream.
[20] investigate the accuracy of the first-order approximation in a Monte Carlo simulation
of merger analysis in oligopoly models and compare it to the corresponding post-merger equi-
librium. They find improvements in accuracy when using UPP with the first-order approxima-
tion. The employment of pass-through in merger simulation techniques [7, 21, 22] has been
much studied in academic settings as well as employed by practitioners in a litigious setting.
[23] focus on the role pass-through may play in improving the prediction of post merger
prices.
[24] evaluates the performance of UPP as a merger screening tool in contrast to standard
structural merger simulation by generating hypothetical mergers using US airline industry
data. She documents favorable results in “best case scenario” when full information is available,
as well as within correct decile predictions. [25] compares UPP with many other merger
screening tools showing that “first-order pricing incentives of merged hospitals (in particular,
WTP and UPP) are more accurate at flagging mergers that are potentially anticompetitive
than the traditional tools of market definition and concentration measurement.”
[26] compare results from UPP and first order approximation with those obtained from
merger simulation for a variety of economic environments as well as different practitioner
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conditions (such as mis-observed demand elasticity, wrong functional form of demand and
pass-through). They show that UPP is accurate with standard log-concave demand systems,
slightly understating the effect in demands with greater convexity. Notably, predicted errors
with UPP do not exceed in magnitude those from merger simulation with misspecified models
or with imprecise demand elasticities. [26] do not include production costs in their setting,
normalizing costs to be zero. This rules out consideration of cost efficiencies, which is the
main focus of our work.
Jointly, these papers provide a compelling argument for adopting first order approximation
techniques in merger analysis. They perform well as compared to full-blown merger simula-
tions, are less computationally heavy, and require less information under a cost variety of dif-
ferent scenarios. This strand of the UPP literature typically does not include efficiencies from a
merger.
Cost efficiencies and UPP
Efficiencies are often used as a motivation for mergers. Indeed, HMG (2010) state that “a pri-
mary benefit of mergers to the economy is their potential to generate significant efficiencies
and thus enhance the merged firm’s ability and incentive to compete, which may result in
lower prices, improved quality, enhanced service, or new products.” Moreover, “[i]n a unilat-
eral effects context, incremental cost reductions may reduce or reverse any increases in the
merged firm’s incentive to elevate price” and thus, at least in principle, should be incorporated
into post-merger price predictions relating to unilateral effects.
Nevertheless, these guidelines caution that efficiency claims alone are not enough to justify
a merger, because “[e]ven when efficiencies generated through a merger enhance a firm’s abil-
ity to compete, however, a merger may have other effects that may lessen competition and
make the merger anticompetitive” (Horizontal Merger Guidelines (2010) §4). Indeed, antitrust
agencies are very skeptical of efficiency claims of pro-competitive effects in rule of reason
analysis (For a comprehensive review of the historical evolution of antitrust policy regarding
merger efficiency claims in the United States and European Union, see [27, Chapter 3]. [28]
explains in a little more detail specificities about the German case and [29] goes through the
asymmetries and implicit bias of competition agencies both in the U.S. and European Union
with regard to the burden of proof). In order to be considered seriously, efficiency claims by
the merging parties have to be merger-specific and verifiable.
“The Agencies credit only those efficiencies likely to be accomplished with the proposed
merger and unlikely to be accomplished in the absence of either the proposed merger or
another means having comparable anticompetitive effects. These are termed merger-spe-
cific efficiencies[. . .] Efficiency claims will not be considered if they are vague, speculative,
or otherwise cannot be verified by reasonable means.[. . .] Cognizable efficiencies are
merger-specific efficiencies that have been verified and do not arise from anticompetitive
reductions in output or service. Cognizable efficiencies are assessed net of costs produced
by the merger or incurred in achieving those efficiencies.” Department of Justice and Fed-
eral Trade Commission Horizontal Merger Guidelines (2010)
This has historically been interpreted to exclude most efficiency claims related to economies
of scale, because scale economies can at least hypothetically be obtained through means other
than a merger [30].
Indeed, in the standard formulation, the total cost of the merged firm is the sum of cost
functions of the merging firms, eliminating cross-firm cost complementarities that typically
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form the basis of merger-specific efficiencies. As shown by [31], mergers in Bertrand-type
markets with differentiated products yield higher prices in the absence of efficiencies.
[1] suggest accommodating efficiencies by including a “standard efficiency-credit”, as in
[32], to serve as a proxy for merger-specific efficiencies. As mentioned in [33], a limitation is
that the “model would still lack empirical verification,” and therefore, should not be used in
lieu of merger-specific efficiencies. UPP computations may be extended to other types of
mergers, including vertical mergers and mergers among firms that produce same type compo-
nents of a composite good, for example, as considered in [34].
We revisit the base model used to derive UPP and include merger-specific cost efficiencies
in the model. Using the theoretical framework in [2], we include efficiencies in a tractable
manner and derive the related UPP formulations. In our framework, cost efficiencies are made
merger-specific by requiring these to be zero if output of either firm in the merger is zero. In
other words, cost efficiencies are activated only for the merged firm and only when outputs of
both merging firms are positive. The new formulations are naturally connected to existing for-
mulations and show how to modify existing formulations to account for cost efficiencies in a
transparent manner. Details are included in the next section.
Theoretical framework
Following [2], let I = {1, . . ., N} be the set of N� 2 firms producing multiple products compet-
ing as Bertrand oligopolists with slightly differentiated goods. The quantity vector of each firm
i is given by Qi(P), where P is the vector of all prices in the industry and Pi is the component of
P with prices for goods of firm i. Profit for firm i is given by pi ¼ P⊺i QiðPÞ   CiðQiðPÞÞ, where
Ci is the cost function for firm i.
The standard UPP formulation is as follows. Suppose firms i and j merge. The profit maxi-
mization problem for the merged firm is given by
maxPM ¼ P⊺i QiðPÞ þ P
⊺
j QjðPÞ   CiðQiðPÞÞ   CjðQjðPÞÞ
























Comparing this to the first-order condition for firm i pre-merger yields upward pricing



















This is the standard UPP formulation used widely in the literature and in antitrust practice.
The term—(@Qi(P)⊺/@Pi)−1 (@Qj(P)⊺/@Pi) is the diversion matrix, which measures proportion
of sales lost by firm i that are recaptured by firm j, and (Pj − @Cj/@Qj) is the margin for firm j.
Both are evaluated at pre-merger values.
Notice that in this formulation there are no merger-specific cost efficiencies, because total
cost for the merged firm is the sum of costs of the merging partners and there are no cross-
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firm cost complementarities. In order to distinguish this from other UPP calculations, we shall
denote this standard formulation with no efficiencies as UPPNoEff.
We include cross-firm cost complementarities by adding an interactive term in the profit-
maximization problem of the merged firm as follows.
maxPM ¼ P⊺i QiðPÞ þ P
⊺
j QjðPÞ   ½CiðQiðPÞÞ þ CjðQjðPÞÞ   �ðQiðPÞ;QjðPÞÞ�
The term ϕ(Qi(P), Qj(P)) is an adjustment (reduction) to total cost of the merged firm that
depends on output of both firms. In order to capture merger-specific efficiencies, we require
this term to be zero if output of either firm is zero: ϕ(Qi(P), 0)) = ϕ(0, Qj(P)) = 0.
































Comparing this to the pre-merger first-order condition yields the following new UPP for-
mulation.













The general form of this formulation exists in the literature, as shown in [17], [1], and [2]. In
the more specific formulation used here, efficiencies show up in a tractable and intuitive man-
ner. The term Dij(Pj − MCj) is the standard UPP formulation. The term @�ðQiðPÞ;QjðPÞÞ=@QiðPÞ
may be viewed as marginal, merger-specific own firm efficiency. It is an adjustment to the stan-
dard UPP formulation arising from own firm efficiency and it serves to lower upward pricing
pressure for good i. The term @�ðQiðPÞ;QjðPÞÞ=@QjðPÞ is marginal, merger-specific partner firm
efficiency. It is an adjustment to the standard UPP formulation arising from partner firm effi-
ciency (modified by the diversion matrix) and it serves to increase upward pricing pressure for
good i. The UPP formulation with efficiencies adjusts the standard UPP formulation for both
these effects. In order to distinguish this from other UPP calculations, we shall denote this for-
mulation with merger-specific efficiencies as UPPModEff.
As is well-known, the standard UPP formulation does not capture the full first-order effect
for a merged firm to raise prices. As shown in the literature, in order to get an accurate first
order approximation of the impulse to raise prices post-merger, the UPP calculation should be
modified by the post-merger pass through matrix. This translates into the following UPP for-








Here, eh is the first-order condition (listed above) for the merged firm and ð@eh=@PðP0ÞÞ  1
and gUPP are evaluated at pre-merger equilibrium prices. UPPFOA uses a theoretically accurate
measure of the change in best response of the merged firm as compared to the firm pre-merger.
The next section implements these formulations in a Monte Carlo setting.
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Monte Carlo
In order to estimate the effect of the theoretical framework with cost efficiencies on the post-
merger equilibrium and different measures of UPP, we use different economic environments
to simulate the model. We use four different demand formulations and two different cost for-
mulations for a total of eight different scenarios.
For the demand side, we use four standard functional forms that have been used widely
in academic research and merger analysis [12, 14, 35]. These are Logit demand, Log-Linear
demand, Linear demand, and Almost Ideal demand. These are also used in other Monte Carlo
studies of UPP [20, 23, 26]. Our demand calibration strategy follows [26], as described in detail
in their appendix (We are grateful to Professor Nathan Miller for sharing his code for this
calibration).
For the cost side, we use two functional forms used in the existing literature: Generalized
Leontief cost [36] and Quadratic cost [37, 38].









In the special case when firms i and j merge, and each firm produces one good, the cost func-
tion for the merged firm is given by:









j and it satisfies merger-specific



























In the special case when firms i and j merge, and each firm produces one good, the cost
function for the merged firm is given by:
CðQi;QjÞ ¼ biiQ2i þ bjjQ
2
j   bijQiQj
In this case, the interactive term is ϕ(Qi, Qj) = βijQiQj and it also satisfies merger-specific cross
complementarity that is activated only from a merger, in the sense that ϕ(Qi, 0) = ϕ(0, Qj) = 0.
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The data generating process is the following.
We suppose that each industry contains four firms competing in prices with differentiated
goods. Each firm produces a single output and industry equilibrium is Bertrand-Nash.
1. Market shares are randomly drawn for each of the four firms and an outside good. The
actual market shares that are used in the process are normalized to aggregate to one for
the market in question. The margin for the first firm is randomly drawn with support
[0.2, 0.8].
2. The parameters for the interactive term in the cost structures are randomly drawn with
support [0, 1]. The rationale behind the support of these parameters being non-negative is
as follows: If the firms would be more inefficient operating jointly than separately, then
even if they merge, there is reason enough to believe they would continue operations
disjointly.
3. Given the market shares and margins, it is possible to calibrate a Logit demand system, and
thus, demand elasticities in the pre-merger equilibrium. Notice that the demand system is
such that its parameters are chosen to rationalize the data drawn in the previous steps. In
this study, consumer substitution behavior is proportional to market shares. These parame-
ters are identified exactly given market shares, prices, and a single margin.
4. Once the Logit demand system is obtained, it is possible to calibrate the remaining
demand functional forms (Log-Linear, Linear and Almost Ideal) such that they are com-
patible with the Logit demand elasticities. Similarly to the Logit case, the demand sys-
tems’ parameters are perfectly identified given market shares, prices, and Logit demand
elasticities.
5. In each draw, two firms go through a merger. Post-merger equilibrium prices are computed
as well as various measures of upward pricing pressure and first order approximation.
6. Repeat these steps until 5,000 draws of data are obtained.
This process yields a total of 40,000 mergers (8 scenarios with 5,000 mergers each).
In order to analyze the accuracy of UPP for price prediction and for merger screening, we
use the following four measures.
• UPPNoEff—This is the standard and widely used UPP calculation with no efficiencies. It
serves as a baseline.
• UPPAvgEff—This is the standard UPP calculation adjusted for average merger efficiencies. It
serves as a benchmark for current practice.
• UPPModEff—This is UPP with merger-specific cost efficiencies, as derived above and as dis-
cussed in more detail below.
• UPPFOA—This is UPP with merger-specific efficiencies and first-order approximation, as
derived above and as discussed in more detail below.
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A starting point for UPP calculations is the standard UPP calculation measuring the value
of diverted sales.
UPPNoEff ¼ UPPi ¼ DijðPj   MCjÞ ð4Þ
As discussed above, UPPNoEff does not include cost efficiencies. This serves as a baseline for
additional analysis.
The second measure we use is the value of diverted sales adjusted for average merger effi-
ciencies.













This measure is an estimate for current practice in the following sense. It is well-known
that in the absence of cost efficiencies, UPP tends to overestimate the increase in post-merger
prices. The standard current practice to account for this is to lower the UPP computation by
some amount, motivating it as a reduction due to cost efficiencies. The amount of this reduc-
tion is a frequent source of debate. When UPP computation is high, merging parties argue
with antitrust agencies that the UPP calculation should be lowered significantly, because there
are cost efficiencies from the merger, but antitrust agencies argue for more realistic numbers
and require additional justification. Current practice is to arrive at some adjustment, in the
form of an efficiency credit.
The measure UPPAvgEff is a benchmark for the current practice of efficiency credits, in the
sense that it adjusts baseline UPP calculation UPPNoEff for the average efficiency realized under
a particular cost complementarity structure. In other words, in the absence of modeling cost
efficiencies, if merging parties and antitrust agencies have to agree to an efficiency credit, their
best guess would be the efficiency that a particular technology generates on average, yielding
the measure UPPAvgEff.
The third measure we use is the UPP calculation adjusted for merger-specific cost efficien-
cies. This is what the standard UPP calculation would be if we derived it using the model
above.













Notice that the only additional information needed to implement UPPModEff as compared
to UPPNoEff is the change in total cost due to marginal merger-specific efficiencies (In particu-
lar, a change in fixed cost due to a merger does not affect these calculations). In other words,
adding a fixed cost term in the total cost curve does not affect the first-order conditions and
therefore, does not affect calculations based on changes in the first-order conditions. In this
sense, the first-order approach to merger analysis (and consequently, derivations based on it,
such as UPP) does not automatically include changes in fixed costs due to a merger. When
fixed cost savings are important, these should be included as additional information in merger
evaluation and would be useful in a more detailed review of the merger. Merging firms typi-
cally provide this type of information to regulators as supporting information for adjustments
to UPP calculations. The formulation here shows how this information and the diversion
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matrix can be used by practitioners to derive a better estimate. Notably, in order to implement
the formulation here, the full functional form of the cost curve is not needed; the additional
information needed is marginal merger-specific efficiencies.







































Here, eh is the first-order condition for the merged firm and ð@eh=@PðP0ÞÞ  1 is the post-
merger pass-through matrix. We know from [26] that in the absence of merger-specific effi-
ciencies, pass-through matrix depends on first and second derivative of demand and does
not require higher order information. Inspection of the form of eh with merger-specific effi-
ciencies (see Eq 1) shows that with efficiencies, the additional information needed to imple-
ment UPPFOA is the first and second derivatives of merger-specific efficiencies. Higher order
information or the full functional form of merger-specific efficiencies are not needed. More-
over, the inverse of the Jacobian of eh used in UPPFOA is typically computed numerically as
analytic forms are not available. Several statistical packages are available in this regard. For
example, consider [42] for a package in R and [43] for STATA.
For each merger, we compute these four UPP measures and compare them with the post-
merger equilibrium price.
The next section presents the results of the Monte Carlo simulations.
Results
Table 1 presents some descriptive summary statistics for the data generated using Monte
Carlo. The median market share for firms is 20%, which is consistent with drawing market
shares for four firms and an outside good. Eighty percent of the margins are distributed
between 0.247 and 0.746 with median at 0.471 (these are pre-merger margin values, not
including merger efficiencies).
Market concentration, as measured by HHI, has a median pre-merger value of 1981,
considered to be a moderately concentrated market according to the Horizontal Merger
Guidelines (2010). According to the U.S. Department of Justice and Federal Trade Commis-
sion Horizontal Merger Guidelines (2010), §5, a market is considered unconcentrated if
HHI� 1500, moderately concentrated if 1500<HHI� 2500 and highly concentrated if
HHI> 2500. Already at the 10th percentile, markets are at least moderately concentrated,
whereas at the 90th percentile markets are highly concentrated pre-merger. This is consistent
with a market comprised of four firms—a market with four equal sized firms would be on the
threshold between moderately and highly concentrated. Market concentration post-merger, as
measured by HHI has a median of 2706, a highly concentrated market. Eighty percent of the
markets are between 1795 and 4066. This increase in concentration is consistent with a market
reduced to three firms. ΔHHI has median of 654, which would trigger further scrutiny from
the Agencies—according to HMG (2010) §5, mergers that increase HHI by less than 100 are
unlikely to be challenged, whereas mergers that increase it by more than 200 will likely require
further action. Fig 1 shows the density kernels for HHI’s pre- and post-merger for all mergers.
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Different measures of UPP yield different post-merger price predictions. UPPNoEff results
in a 10.7% increase in prices at the median, with eighty percent distributed between 2.1% and
27.5%. With more accurate methods to incorporate merger specific efficiencies, there are
lower increases in price prediction. For UPPFOA, it is 1.2% and eighty percent distributed
between −61.9% and 25.3%.
Own merger pass through is highest with Log-Linear demand and lowest with Linear
demand. Cross-merger pass-through is highest with Almost Ideal demand and lowest with
Log-Linear demand. Merger price effects are smallest with Linear demand (1.7% at the
median), then Logit demand (2.7%), then Almost Ideal demand (5%), and then Log-Linear
demand (7.8%).
Price prediction accuracy
For price prediction accuracy, we compute absolute errors and relative errors as follows.
Table 1. Descriptive statistics.
Median 10% 25% 75% 90%
MARKET CONDITIONS
Market share 0.201 0.050 0.114 0.276 0.339
Margin 0.471 0.247 0.333 0.623 0.746
MARKET CONCENTRATION
Pre-Merger 1981 1418 1642 2436 2872
Post-Merger 2706 1795 2159 3360 4066
ΔHHI 654 113 310 1075 1527
UPWARD PRICING PRESSURE
UPPNoEff 0.107 0.021 0.053 0.184 0.265
UPPAvgEff 0.021 -0.115 -0.045 0.104 0.192
UPPModEff 0.013 -0.248 -0.070 0.058 0.108
UPPFOA 0.012 -0.619 -0.115 0.074 0.253
OWN MERGER PASS-THROUGH
Logit 0.801 0.675 0.733 0.880 0.943
Linear 0.533 0.510 0.520 0.550 0.569
Log-Linear 1.927 1.344 1.515 2.671 3.601
Almost Ideal 1.210 0.782 0.907 1.776 2.522
CROSS MERGER PASS-THROUGH
Logit 0.038 0.007 0.018 0.063 0.089
Linear 0.090 0.024 0.053 0.120 0.152
Log-Linear 0.000 -0.000 -0.000 0.000 0.000
Almost Ideal 0.227 0.057 0.125 0.409 0.778
MERGER PRICE EFFECTS
Logit 0.023 -0.158 -0.019 0.064 0.113
Linear 0.017 -0.137 -0.038 0.054 0.106
Log-Linear 0.078 -0.444 -0.047 0.288 0.939
Almost Ideal 0.050 -0.287 -0.025 0.175 0.503
Notes: Summary statistics are based on 5,000 randomly-drawn sets of data on the pre and post-merger equilibria. The values for market share and margin are for all four
firms. Market share and margin are drawn randomly in the data generating process. Own merger pass-through is the first element of the diagonal of ½@ehðPÞ=@PðP0Þ�  1,
and cross merger pass-through is the first off-diagonal element of ½@ehðPÞ=@PðP0Þ�  1. The merger price effects are the change in firm 1’s equilibrium price.
https://doi.org/10.1371/journal.pone.0227418.t001
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Absolute prediction error: APE = |PUPP − PPost|
Relative prediction error: RPE ¼ jPUPP   PPostj=PPost
Here PUPP is the price given by a particular UPP calculation and PPost is the computed post-
merger equilibrium price. As pre-merger prices are normalized to unity, APE gives prediction
error in percentage points and RPE gives percent error. For example, if PUPP = 1.11 and PPost =
1.05 then (because pre-merger price is 1), APE = 6 percentage points and RPE = 5.7 percent.
Fig 2 presents the analysis for the environment with Logit demand system and Generalized
Leontief cost structure. The figure has eight panels. The four columns correspond to the four
UPP calculations defined above: UPPNoEff, UPPAvgEff, UPPModEff, and UPPFOA. The top row
corresponds to the case where these calculations are made using own firm efficiency only
(a case that is frequently used in practice) and the bottom row corresponds to the case where
these calculations are made using both own firm efficiency and partner firm efficiency. The
bottom row uses the four calculations defined above.
In each panel, the x-axis measures the predicted post-merger price using a particular UPP
calculation, and the y-axis measures the true post-merger equilibrium price. Each point in a
panel corresponds to one merger. Points on the diagonal are those mergers for which the price
prediction using the UPP calculation for that panel is exactly the same as the true post-merger
Fig 1. Market concentration pre and post-merger. Shows the distribution of market concentration within the markets pre and post merger as
measured by the Herfindahl Hirschman Index. Simplifying assumption for post-merger increase in HHI is twice the product of the merging parties pre-
merger market share, as used in merger screening.
https://doi.org/10.1371/journal.pone.0227418.g001
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equilibrium price. Points above the diagonal are those mergers for which the UPP calculation
under-predicts the true post-merger price. Points below the diagonal are those mergers for
which the UPP calculation over-predicts the true post-merger price.
Consider the first column in Fig 2. In the top panel (labeled UPPNoEff), the x-axis measures
the post-merger price increase using UPPNoEff and the y-axis measures the true post-merger
equilibrium price. As UPPNoEff excludes efficiencies, most of the data over-predicts the true
post-merger prices and lies below the diagonal, as expected. The data appear truncated at 1.0
(the pre-merger equilibrium price) because in the absence of cost efficiencies, UPPNoEff pre-
dicts a price increase, even when the true post-merger price is lower, as expected. The bottom
panel is the same as the top panel, because the difference in UPP calculation between own firm
efficiency and the combined efficiency of both firms arises only when the UPP calculation
includes efficiencies. In both panels, median APE is 14.3 p.p. and median RPE is 13.6%. The
density kernels of APE are given in the corresponding panels in Fig 3 and that of RPE in the
corresponding panels in Fig 4.
The second column in Fig 2 (labeled UPPAvgEff) adjusts UPPNoEff for an efficiency credit
based on the average efficiency generated by a particular technology (Generalized Leontief in
this case). As discussed above, this a proxy for the current practice of adjusting the UPP calcu-
lation for an efficiency credit. As compared to panels in column 1, this moves the data toward
the left. The top panel in this column considers average efficiency for own firm only and the
bottom panel considers average combined efficiency for both partners in a merger. As com-
pared to the first column, the data in the second column is dispersed somewhat more evenly
across the diagonal, indicating improved price prediction accuracy. This shows up in lower
price prediction errors. In the top panel, median APE is 10.7 p.p. (a gain in price prediction
accuracy of about 3.6 percentage points over UPPNoEff) and median RPE is 10.3% (a gain of
about 3.3 percentage points over UPPNoEff). In the bottom panel, the corresponding numbers
Fig 2. Accuracy of prediction—Logit demand, Generalized Leontief cost. First row shows the distribution of the true post merger prices against the
predicted post merger prices using different UPP calculations and own goods’ efficiencies included in the computation. Second row shows the same for
both goods’ efficiencies.
https://doi.org/10.1371/journal.pone.0227418.g002
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are 9.9 p.p. for APE (a gain of 4.4 p.p.) and 9.6% for RPE (a gain of 4 p.p.). The density kernels
of APE are given in the corresponding panels in Fig 3 and that of RPE in the corresponding
panels in Fig 4.
The third column in Fig 2 (labeled UPPModEff) uses the new UPP calculation based on
model-based, merger-specific Generalized Leontief cost complementarities. Both panels show
a noticeable clustering of the data around the diagonal, indicating further improvements in
price prediction. In the top panel, median APE is 7 p.p. (a gain of 3.7 percentage points over
current practice proxy using UPPAvgEff) and median RPE is 7.3% (a gain of about 3.3 percent-
age points over UPPAvgEff). The bottom panel shows that accounting for the combined effi-
ciency effect of both merger partners yields even greater gains in price prediction accuracy,
consistent with the theory. In the bottom panel, median APE is 2 p.p. (a gain of 7.9 p.p. over
UPPAvgEff) and median RPE is 1.9% (a gain of 7.7 p.p.). The density kernels of APE are given in
the corresponding panels in Fig 3 and those of RPE in the corresponding panels in Fig 4.
Finally, the fourth column in Fig 2 (labeled UPPFOA) uses the first-order approximation to
adjust UPPModEff by the pass-through matrix. As mentioned above, this is a theoretically accu-
rate measure of the first impulse to change prices. Both panels show greater clustering of data
around the diagonal, with notable improvement in the bottom panel. In the top panel, median
APE shrinks to 3.9 p.p. (a gain of 6.8 percentage points over current practice proxy using
UPPAvgEff) and median RPE is 4% (a gain of about 7.3 percentage points over UPPAvgEff). In the
Fig 3. Absolute prediction errors—Logit demand system, Generalized Leontief cost. Portrays density kernels for absolute prediction errors, as well
as the median absolute prediction error, first and third quartile for each specification.
https://doi.org/10.1371/journal.pone.0227418.g003
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bottom panel, median APE is only 0.3 p.p. (a gain of 9.6 p.p. over UPPAvgEff) and median RPE
is 0.2% (a gain of 9.4 p.p.).
Put differently, in the bottom panel of column four, absolute price prediction errors
decrease 97% (from 9.9 p.p. to 0.3 p.p., at the median) and relative price prediction errors
decrease 97% (from 9.6% to 0.2%, at the median) as we move from current practice (using
UPPAvgEff) to a more theoretically accurate measure using UPPFOA. More generally, the entire
density kernel of the corresponding APE (Fig 3, bottom right panel) and of RPE (Fig 4, bottom
right panel) compresses toward zero.
Figs 2–4 indicate presence of substantial gains from reforming the standard UPP calcula-
tion to include cost efficiencies (for both merging partners) and in a manner guided by the
model and to use first-order approximation. These results are based on Logit demand and
Generalized Leontief costs. A similar pattern is seen for the other seven scenarios as well. This
is documented in S1–S21 Figs.
A summary of all eight scenarios is given in Table 2. As shown in Table 2, in seven of eight
scenarios, UPPFOA based price predictions are within 3% of post-merger equilibrium prices at
the median, both in absolute and relative terms.
The log-linear case is an exception, likely related to curvature of utility, causing the diagonal
elements of the merger pass-through matrix to exceed one, as documented in [26]. The average
reduction in price prediction errors (UPPFOA compared to UPPAvgEff) in these seven scenarios
is 93%.
Fig 4. Relative prediction errors—Logit demand system, Generalized Leontief cost. Portrays density kernels for relative prediction errors, as well as
the median relative prediction error, first and third quartile for each specification.
https://doi.org/10.1371/journal.pone.0227418.g004
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Moreover, in five scenarios, UPPFOA based price predictions are within 0.25% of post-
merger equilibrium prices at the median, both in absolute and relative terms. The average
reduction in price prediction errors (UPPFOA compared to UPPAvgEff) in these five scenarios is
98%. Altogether, the results show considerable evidence for using cost efficiencies in the man-
ner guided by the model and a more accurate first-order approximation in UPP calculations.
Merger screening accuracy
We also use these data to investigate accuracy of different UPP formulations as pre-merger
screening tools. As mentioned earlier, UPP is being used increasingly as a pre-merger
Table 2. Improvement in price prediction.
GENERALIZED LEONTIEF COST
Logit Demand NoEff AvgEff ModEff FOA Linear Demand NoEff AvgEff ModEff FOA
APE (p.p.) APE (p.p.)
Median 14.30 9.95 1.95 0.25 Median 14.34 8.73 2.26 0.00
Absolute Gain over AvgEff 8.00 9.69 Absolute Gain over AvgEff 6.47 8.73
Relative Gain over AvgEff 80.39 97.47 Relative Gain over AvgEff 74.08 100.00
RPE (%) RPE (%)
Median 13.62 9.58 1.88 0.24 Median 14.38 8.72 2.23 0.00
Absolute Gain over AvgEff 7.70 9.34 Absolute Gain over AvgEff 6.50 8.72
Relative Gain over AvgEff 80.33 97.51 Relative Gain over AvgEff 74.49 100.00
Log-Linear Demand NoEff AvgEff ModEff FOA Almost Ideal Demand NoEff AvgEff ModEff FOA
APE (p.p.) APE (p.p.)
Median 33.15 27.79 19.55 15.18 Median 21.43 16.71 8.17 1.71
Absolute Gain over AvgEff 8.24 12.60 Absolute Gain over AvgEff 8.54 14.99
Relative Gain over AvgEff 29.64 45.36 Relative Gain over AvgEff 51.10 89.74
RPE (%) RPE (%)
Median 34.75 28.79 22.92 16.04 Median 22.01 16.93 9.15 1.76
Absolute Gain over AvgEff 5.87 12.75 Absolute Gain over AvgEff 7.78 15.17
Relative Gain over AvgEff 20.40 44.27 Relative Gain over AvgEff 45.94 89.60
QUADRATIC COST
Logit Demand NoEff AvgEff ModEff FOA Linear Demand NoEff AvgEff ModEff FOA
APE (p.p.) APE (p.p.)
Median 5.89 3.84 0.62 0.02 Median 6.15 3.94 1.12 0.00
Absolute Gain over AvgEff 3.22 3.82 Absolute Gain over AvgEff 2.83 3.94
Relative Gain over AvgEff 83.81 99.47 Relative Gain over AvgEff 71.67 100.00
RPE (%) RPE (%)
Median 5.63 3.73 0.59 0.02 Median 5.91 3.82 1.08 0.00
Absolute Gain over AvgEff 3.14 3.71 Absolute Gain over AvgEff 2.75 3.82
Relative Gain over AvgEff 84.16 99.49 Relative Gain over AvgEff 71.86 100.00
Log-Linear Demand NoEff AvgEff ModEff FOA Almost Ideal Demand NoEff AvgEff ModEff FOA
APE (p.p.) APE (p.p.)
Median 5.37 8.73 9.60 2.92 Median 2.61 4.30 3.60 0.21
Absolute Gain over AvgEff -0.87 5.81 Absolute Gain over AvgEff 0.70 4.08
Relative Gain over AvgEff -9.98 66.54 Relative Gain over AvgEff 16.27 95.00
RPE (%) RPE (%)
Median 4.71 7.68 8.32 2.29 Median 2.36 4.11 3.33 0.20
Absolute Gain over AvgEff -0.64 5.39 Absolute Gain over AvgEff 0.78 3.91
Relative Gain over AvgEff -8.38 70.15 Relative Gain over AvgEff 18.92 95.21
https://doi.org/10.1371/journal.pone.0227418.t002
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screening tool by antitrust agencies in the United States and worldwide, mainly because it is
relatively quick and easy to implement, requires less information than some other measures,
and is grounded in theory.
The typical use of UPP is to flag a merger for further scrutiny if the UPP calculation is
above a given threshold. As UPP is not a perfect predictor of post-merger prices, this leads to
two familiar errors: false positives and false negatives.
A false positive occurs when the UPP screen flags a merger for further analysis but post-
merger equilibrium prices are below the acceptable threshold. A false positive may lead to
unnecessary use of resources by both the antitrust agencies and the merging parties to investi-
gate or block a merger that does not have significant anticompetitive effects. We term this a
Type I error.
A false negative occurs when the UPP screen does not flag a merger for further analysis but
post-merger equilibrium prices are above the acceptable threshold. A false negative allows a
merger to go through even if it has significant anticompetitive effects and may harm consum-
ers. We term this a Type II error.
As a baseline, consider a 5% price increase threshold. This is a common threshold in anti-
trust analysis, and is also used in the SSNIP test.
Graphically, in each panel in Fig 5, draw a vertical line intersecting the x-axis at 1.05, and
a horizontal line intersecting the y-axis at 1.05. Mergers to the right of the vertical line are
flagged for further scrutiny by the UPP screen and mergers to the left are not. Mergers above
the horizontal line have high post-merger price increases (relative to the acceptable threshold)
and mergers below the line have low post-merger price increases. Therefore, all mergers in
the bottom right quadrant are false positives (flagged for further scrutiny incorrectly) and all
mergers in the top left quadrant are false negatives (letting a merger go through incorrectly).
As expected, and as shown in the first column in Fig 5 (labeled UPPNoEff), in the presence
of merger efficiencies, not including these efficiencies in UPP calculation leads to a sizable
Fig 5. 5% threshold on decision rule for price increases.
https://doi.org/10.1371/journal.pone.0227418.g005
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number of false positives (about 57.9 percent of all mergers) and perhaps a few false negatives
(3.5 percent). In this case, the total probability of making a type I or type II error is 0.614
(about 61.4 percent of all mergers).
Adjusting UPP for average efficiencies for both merger partners (second column, lower
row in Fig 5), the probability of false positives declines to 0.175, probability of false negatives
increases to 0.092, and total probability of type I and type II error decreases to 0.267. This is
what may be expected using the current practice of efficiency credits (in the scenario with
Logit demand and Generalized Leontief cost complementarities).
Using the UPPModEff calculation that includes model-based cost efficiencies (third column,
lower row in Fig 5), the total probability of making a type I or type II error goes down to 0.057,
and using UPPFOA calculation lowers this total probability even more to 0.017 (about 1.7 per-
cent of all mergers).
In other words, total probability of making a merger screening error decreases 79% (from
0.267 to 0.057) as we move from current practice (using UPPAvgEff) to model-based UPPModEff
and decreases 94% (from 0.267 to 0.017) as we move from current practice to UPPFOA. These
results are based on Logit demand and Generalized Leontief costs. A similar pattern is seen for
many of the other scenarios as well, as documented in Table 3. Notably, in six of the eight sce-
narios, using UPPFOA reduces total probability of false positive and false negatives to less than
0.02 (The exceptional cases are still the ones with log-linear demand as discussed above).
The average reduction in total probability of making an error in these cases is 96%.
Table 3. Improvement in merger screening accuracy—5% tolerance threshold.
GENERALIZED LEONTIEF
Logit Demand NoEff AvgEff ModEff FOA Linear Demand NoEff AvgEff ModEff FOA
Type I error 0.579 0.175 0.022 0.010 Type I error 0.582 0.173 0.030 0.000
Type II error 0.035 0.092 0.035 0.008 Type II error 0.000 0.051 0.004 0.000
Total 0.614 0.267 0.057 0.017 Total 0.583 0.224 0.034 0.000
Absolute Gain w.r.t. AvgEff 0.210 0.250 Absolute Gain w.r.t. AvgEff 0.190 0.224
Relative Gain w.r.t. AvgEff (%) 78.78 93.53 Relative Gain w.r.t. AvgEff (%) 84.94 100.00
Log-Linear Demand NoEff AvgEff ModEff FOA Almost Ideal Demand NoEff AvgEff ModEff FOA
Type I error 0.408 0.079 0.015 0.083 Type I error 0.430 0.084 0.014 0.003
Type II error 0.014 0.157 0.137 0.042 Type II error 0.008 0.131 0.091 0.010
Total 0.422 0.235 0.152 0.125 Total 0.438 0.215 0.105 0.013
Absolute Gain w.r.t. AvgEff 0.083 0.110 Absolute Gain w.r.t. AvgEff 0.110 0.202
Relative Gain w.r.t. AvgEff (%) 35.41 46.91 Relative Gain w.r.t. AvgEff (%) 51.30 93.90
QUADRATIC
Logit Demand NoEff AvgEff ModEff FOA Linear Demand NoEff AvgEff ModEff FOA
Type I error 0.334 0.172 0.075 0.006 Type I error 0.402 0.238 0.143 0.000
Type II error 0.000 0.019 0.000 0.001 Type II error 0.000 0.017 0.000 0.000
Total 0.334 0.190 0.075 0.007 Total 0.402 0.255 0.143 0.000
Absolute Gain w.r.t. AvgEff 0.115 0.184 Absolute Gain w.r.t. AvgEff 0.112 0.255
Relative Gain w.r.t. AvgEff (%) 60.61 96.53 Relative Gain w.r.t. AvgEff (%) 43.80 100.00
Log-Linear Demand NoEff AvgEff ModEff FOA Almost Ideal Demand NoEff AvgEff ModEff FOA
Type I error 0.062 0.034 0.031 0.015 Type I error 0.122 0.041 0.031 0.003
Type II error 0.052 0.208 0.281 0.112 Type II error 0.010 0.114 0.176 0.003
Total 0.114 0.242 0.311 0.126 Total 0.132 0.155 0.206 0.007
Absolute Gain w.r.t. AvgEff -0.069 0.116 Absolute Gain w.r.t. AvgEff -0.051 0.148
Relative Gain w.r.t. AvgEff (%) -28.48 47.87 Relative Gain w.r.t. AvgEff (%) -33.12 95.75
https://doi.org/10.1371/journal.pone.0227418.t003
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Moreover, in four scenarios, using UPPFOA (over UPPAvgEff) reduces total probability of
false positives and false negatives to less than 0.007. The average reduction in making a merger
screening error in these four cases is 98%. In order to check robustness of these results, we ran
the analysis with thresholds of 0 percent, 10 percent, and 15 percent as well. The results were
similar.
As another robustness check, we use a different measure of the test’s accuracy, its F1 score.





True test positives are those cases which are actually true and the test identifies them as
true. All test positives are those cases which the test identifies as true (whether they are actually
true or not is immaterial). The precision ratio measures truly predicted positives as a fraction
of total predicted positives. In terms of Fig 4, mergers in the top right quadrant are true test




True test positives are the same as before. All true positives are those cases that are actually
true (whether the test identifies them as true or false is immaterial). The recall ratio measures
truly predicted positives as a fraction of truly total positives. In terms of Fig 4, mergers in
the top right quadrant are true test positives and mergers above the vertical line are all true
positives.
F1 score is the harmonic mean of these ratios, given by
F1 score ¼




2 � Precision � Recall
Precisionþ Recall
Recall that for two positive numbers, the harmonic mean is (weakly) lower than the geo-
metric mean, which is (weakly) lower than the arithmetic mean. Moreover, as both precision
and recall ratios are in the unit interval, the F1 score is in the unit interval, and higher values
for precision and recall ratios imply a higher F1 score.
Table 4 shows the precision ratio, recall ratio, and F1 score for each of the cases and com-
putes improvement in F1 score, in a format analogous to Table 3.
Table 4 shows a pattern similar to Table 3. As is well-known, UPPNoEff is biased toward pre-
dicting positives, in the sense that if there is no adjustment for efficiencies, it predicts many
mergers will raise prices even when prices may not truly increase, and therefore, adjustments
for merger efficiencies are important both from a practitioner’s standpoint and from a theoret-
ical standpoint. In Table 3, this shows up in a high incidence of Type I errors and low inci-
dence of Type II errors for UPPNoEff. For precision and recall ratios, this implies that the
precision ratio for UPPNoEff would tend to be closer to zero and the recall ratio closer to one, as
shown in Table 4.
Similar to the pattern in Table 3, F1 score increases 77% (from 0.490 to 0.867) as we move
from current practice (using UPPAvgEff) to UPPModEff, and it increases 96% (from 0.490 to
0.960) as we move from current practice to UPPFOA. These results are based on Logit demand
and Generalized Leontief costs. A similar pattern is seen for many of the other scenarios as
well.
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In all eight scenarios, the F1 score with UPPFOA is higher than that for the benchmark
UPPAvgEff, with large gains in many cases. Notably, gains in F1 score are gains in harmonic
mean, which weights lower numbers more, and therefore, makes it harder to get increases in
the F1 score. Moreover, in five of the eight scenarios, the F1 score is very high, at a level 0.96
or above, and each of the precision and recall ratios in these cases are at 0.95 or above. Over-
all, these results support the results in Table 3. Additional details are presented in S1–S3
Tables.
Taken together, these results present more evidence of the benefit from including cost effi-
ciencies in a manner guided by the model and the benefit of using a more accurate first-order
approximation in UPP calculations. In particular, the results indicate that these UPP measures
may be a good proxy for full merger simulations.
Comparison to UPP with higher efficiency thresholds
We know that some adjustment to UPPNoEff is needed to account for merger efficiencies. The
previous analysis accounts for this by using the average efficiency generated by a given tech-
nology and showing how UPPModEff and UPPFOA may improve upon that.
As another check on the validity of the results above, we consider different price increase
thresholds for UPPNoEff proposed in the literature and compare these to a stricter 0 percent
threshold for UPPModEff and UPPFOA, as follows.
Table 4. Improvement in merger screening accuracy—5% tolerance threshold.
GENERALIZED LEONTIEF
Logit Demand NoEff AvgEff ModEff FOA Linear Demand NoEff AvgEff ModEff FOA
Precision Ratio 0.243 0.423 0.894 0.955 Precision Ratio 0.238 0.431 0.857 1.000
Recall Ratio 0.840 0.582 0.842 0.965 Recall Ratio 0.998 0.718 0.978 1.000
F1 score 0.376 0.490 0.867 0.960 F1 score 0.385 0.539 0.914 1.000
Absolute Gain over AvgEff 0.285 0.470 Absolute Gain over AvgEff 0.375 0.461
Relative Gain over AvgEff (%) 76.96 95.89 Relative Gain over AvgEff (%) 69.51 85.56
Log-Linear Demand NoEff AvgEff ModEff FOA Almost Ideal Demand NoEff AvgEff ModEff FOA
Precision Ratio 0.375 0.400 0.671 0.626 Precision Ratio 0.356 0.425 0.771 0.868
Recall Ratio 0.839 0.356 0.409 0.633 Recall Ratio 0.863 0.410 0.510 0.710
F1 score 0.518 0.377 0.508 0.629 F1 score 0.504 0.418 0.614 0.781
Absolute Gain over AvgEff 0.132 0.253 Absolute Gain over AvgEff 0.196 0.363
Relative Gain over AvgEff (%) 34.95 67.08 Relative Gain over AvgEff (%) 46.99 87.02
QUADRATIC
Logit Demand NoEff AvgEff ModEff FOA Linear Demand NoEff AvgEff ModEff FOA
Precision Ratio 0.563 0.706 0.852 0.986 Precision Ratio 0.474 0.592 0.717 1.000
Recall Ratio 1.000 0.957 1.000 0.999 Recall Ratio 0.999 0.952 0.999 1.000
F1 score 0.721 0.812 0.920 0.992 F1 score 0.643 0.730 0.835 1.000
Absolute Gain over AvgEff 0.108 0.180 Absolute Gain over AvgEff 0.104 0.270
Relative Gain over AvgEff (%) 13.23 22.14 Relative Gain over AvgEff (%) 14.31 36.92
Log-Linear Demand NoEff AvgEff ModEff FOA Almost Ideal Demand NoEff AvgEff ModEff FOA
Precision Ratio 0.889 0.872 0.849 0.975 Precision Ratio 0.822 0.887 0.891 0.987
Recall Ratio 0.922 0.691 0.582 0.774 Recall Ratio 0.984 0.811 0.705 0.950
F1 score 0.906 0.771 0.690 0.863 F1 score 0.896 0.847 0.787 0.968
Absolute Gain over AvgEff -0.081 0.092 Absolute Gain over AvgEff -0.061 0.121
Relative Gain over AvgEff (%) -10.46 11.93 Relative Gain over AvgEff (%) -7.15 14.27
https://doi.org/10.1371/journal.pone.0227418.t004
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In the previous analysis, we consider a 5 percent threshold, due to its use as a benchmark
for market definition in the hypothetical monopolist test, as described in 4.1.2 of HMG
(2010) (Despite of the Agencies saying that the small but significant non transitory increase
in price (SSNIP) is a threshold for market definition, as does not reflect their tolerance
towards price increase, it is still a good indicator of what could potentially be considered
anticompetitive.), as well as its proximity to the optimal threshold for UPP of four percent
estimated in [25]. [1] suggest “using a starkly simple default value for efficiencies” that could,
for example, be 10 percent. This would allow, in principle, to postpone more specific estima-
tion of merger-specific efficiencies after evaluating the results of an initial screen, similar to
suggestions in [32]. This 10 percent threshold is used by Miller et al. (2017) to analyze the
occurrence of false positives and negatives in UPP. [44] analyzes antitrust cases evaluated by
the FTC from 1993 until mid-2010 and concludes that an implicit benchmark used for UPP
is 15 percent.
In order to provide a comparison to the current practice of using UPPNoEff with higher
thresholds, we compare probability of Type I and Type II errors using price increase thresh-
olds of 5%, 10%, and 15% for UPPNoEff and a stricter threshold of 0% for UPPModEff and
UPPFOA. As shown in Table 5, in each of the eight scenarios, total probability of making type I
Table 5. Baseline UPP with higher thresholds.
GENERALIZED LEONTIEF
Logit Linear
UPPNoEff UPPModEff UPPFOA UPPNoEff UPPModEff UPPFOA
5% 10% 15% 0% 0% 5% 10% 15% 0% 0%
Type I error 0.579 0.436 0.295 0.000 0.020 Type I error 0.582 0.433 0.292 0.030 0.000
Type II error 0.035 0.026 0.021 0.060 0.001 Type II error 0.000 0.001 0.001 0.005 0.000
Total error 0.614 0.462 0.316 0.060 0.021 Total error 0.583 0.434 0.293 0.035 0.000
Log-Linear Almost Ideal
UPPNoEff UPPModEff UPPFOA UPPNoEff UPPModEff UPPFOA
5% 10% 15% 0% 0% 5% 10% 15% 0% 0%
Type I error 0.408 0.224 0.104 0.041 0.097 Type I error 0.430 0.244 0.119 0.038 0.005
Type II error 0.014 0.044 0.086 0.038 0.039 Type II error 0.008 0.024 0.050 0.022 0.010
Total error 0.422 0.267 0.190 0.079 0.136 Total error 0.438 0.268 0.169 0.059 0.015
QUADRATIC
Logit Linear
UPPNoEff UPPModEff UPPFOA UPPNoEff UPPModEff UPPFOA
5% 10% 15% 0% 0% 5% 10% 15% 0% 0%
Type I error 0.334 0.406 0.306 0.000 0.000 Type I error 0.402 0.412 0.295 0.002 0.000
Type II error 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 Type II error 0.000 0.003 0.001 0.000 0.000
Total error 0.334 0.406 0.306 0.000 0.000 Total error 0.402 0.415 0.296 0.002 0.000
Log-Linear Almost Ideal
UPPNoEff UPPModEff UPPFOA UPPNoEff UPPModEff UPPFOA
5% 10% 15% 0% 0% 5% 10% 15% 0% 0%
Type I error 0.062 0.048 0.035 0.034 0.002 Type I error 0.122 0.096 0.063 0.031 0.001
Type II error 0.052 0.130 0.200 0.000 0.081 Type II error 0.010 0.037 0.074 0.000 0.003
Total error 0.114 0.178 0.235 0.034 0.083 Total error 0.132 0.133 0.137 0.032 0.004
Table shows the percentage of error types in merger screening for UPP baseline formulation (for 5, 10, and 15% tolerance threshold) when compared to UPP with
model-based efficiencies and first-order approximation (with a strict tolerance of 0% threshold).
https://doi.org/10.1371/journal.pone.0227418.t005
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and II errors with a 0% threshold for UPPModEff and UPPFOA is lower than with a 15% thresh-
old for UPPNoEff, and in many cases it is substantially lower.
The difference between using higher thresholds for UPPNoEff and a zero threshold for
UPPModEff and UPPFOA is starker when viewed through the lens of F1 score. As shown in
Table 6, at higher thresholds for UPPNoEff, the F1 score actually goes down. Indeed, both the
precision ratio and the recall ratio go down as well. In other words, when using UPPNoEff at
higher thresholds, true test positives as a fraction of total test positives go down and true test
positives as a fraction of total true positives go down as well. Put differently, false test positives
make up a growing share of all test positives and false test negatives make up a growing share
of all true positives. In this sense, the test is increasingly likely to predict false positives and
false negatives, and delivers decreasing F1 scores.
In contrast, the F1 scores remain high for both UPPModEff and UPPFOA at a zero percent
threshold.
Curvature of merger-specific efficiencies
The analysis above focuses on the case when cost complementarities across merging firms may
be proxied by Generalized Leontief or Quadratic costs. In this section, we present additional
Table 6. Baseline UPP with higher thresholds.
GENERALIZED LEONTIEF
Logit Linear
UPPNoEff UPPModEff UPPFOA UPPNoEff UPPModEff UPPFOA
5% 10% 15% 0% 0% 5% 10% 15% 0% 0%
Precision Ratio 0.243 0.180 0.147 0.999 0.953 Precision Ratio 0.238 0.186 0.157 0.915 1.000
Recall Ratio 0.840 0.787 0.711 0.855 0.997 Recall Ratio 0.998 0.992 0.982 0.984 1.000
F1 score 0.376 0.293 0.244 0.921 0.975 F1 score 0.385 0.313 0.270 0.949 1.000
Log-Linear Almost Ideal
UPPNoEff UPPModEff UPPFOA UPPNoEff UPPModEff UPPFOA
5% 10% 15% 0% 0% 5% 10% 15% 0% 0%
Precision Ratio 0.375 0.379 0.375 0.734 0.646 Precision Ratio 0.356 0.365 0.372 0.790 0.872
Recall Ratio 0.839 0.682 0.488 0.661 0.653 Recall Ratio 0.863 0.750 0.592 0.702 0.725
F1 score 0.518 0.487 0.424 0.695 0.650 F1 score 0.504 0.491 0.457 0.743 0.792
QUADRATIC
Logit Linear
UPPNoEff UPPModEff UPPFOA UPPNoEff UPPModEff UPPFOA
5% 10% 15% 0% 0% 5% 10% 15% 0% 0%
Precision Ratio 0.563 0.238 0.118 1.000 1.000 Precision Ratio 0.474 0.225 0.150 0.998 1.000
Recall Ratio 1.000 1.000 1.000 1.000 1.000 Recall Ratio 0.999 0.979 0.975 1.000 1.000
F1 score 0.721 0.384 0.211 1.000 1.000 F1 score 0.643 0.366 0.260 0.999 1.000
Log-Linear Almost Ideal
UPPNoEff UPPModEff UPPFOA UPPNoEff UPPModEff UPPFOA
5% 10% 15% 0% 0% 5% 10% 15% 0% 0%
Precision Ratio 0.889 0.825 0.719 0.966 0.997 Precision Ratio 0.822 0.767 0.711 0.968 0.998
Recall Ratio 0.922 0.755 0.532 1.000 0.836 Recall Ratio 0.984 0.912 0.759 0.999 0.952
F1 score 0.906 0.788 0.612 0.983 0.909 F1 score 0.896 0.833 0.734 0.984 0.974
Table shows the F1 scores and its components in merger screening for UPP baseline formulation (for 5, 10, and 15% tolerance threshold) when compared to UPP with
model-based efficiencies and first-order approximation (with a strict tolerance of 0% threshold).
https://doi.org/10.1371/journal.pone.0227418.t006
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results for the case when merger-specific efficiencies may have different curvature, as follows.






where γ 2 [0, 1] parameterizes curvature of ϕ. The case g ¼ 1
2
corresponds to the case of Gener-
alized Leontief costs (and γ = 1 is used for efficiencies in the case of Quadratic costs). The




j is a convex function, and therefore, yields a well-
defined concave profit-maximization problem. This provides a tractable class of merger-spe-
cific efficiencies with different curvature.
In order to keep the analysis manageable, consider the case of Generalized Leontief costs
with flexible merger-specific efficiencies, formalized as follows.





The Monte Carlo simulation is conducted as earlier with four demand systems, with this
cost function, and using an additional random draw for the parameter γ 2 [0, 1]. This yields
another 20,000 mergers (4 scenarios, each with 5,000 mergers). Results for these scenarios are
summarized in Tables 7, 8, and 9.
As shown in Table 7, there are substantial gains in price prediction accuracy (over UPPAvgEff)
at the median similar to the corresponding cases in Table 2. As shown in the top panel in
Table 8, there are notable reductions in total errors, and as shown in the bottom panel in
Table 8, there are substantial improvements in F1 score as well.
As shown in Table 9, UPPNoEff with higher thresholds continues to perform worse in terms
of total errors, as compared to UPPModEff and UPPFOA at a zero threshold. Moreover, UPPNoEff
with higher thresholds continues to perform poorly in terms of F1 score, whereas UPPModEff
and UPPFOA at zero threshold continue to possess substantially higher F1 scores. Additional
details are presented in S4 and S5 Tables.
Table 7. Improvement in price prediction.
CURVATURE
Logit Demand NoEff AvgEff ModEff FOA Linear Demand NoEff AvgEff ModEff FOA
APE (p.p.) APE (p.p.)
Median 10.71 9.00 0.90 0.08 Median 10.73 8.34 1.24 0.00
Absolute Gain over AvgEff 8.10 8.93 Absolute Gain over AvgEff 7.09 8.34
Relative Gain over AvgEff (%) 90.00 99.16 Relative Gain over AvgEff (%) 85.11 100.00
RPE (%) RPE (%)
Median 10.09 8.67 0.86 0.07 Median 10.51 8.16 1.20 0.00
Absolute Gain over AvgEff 7.81 8.60 Absolute Gain over AvgEff 6.95 8.16
Relative Gain over AvgEff (%) 90.12 99.19 Relative Gain over AvgEff (%) 85.25 100.00
Log-Linear Demand NoEff AvgEff ModEff FOA Almost Ideal Demand NoEff AvgEff ModEff FOA
APE (p.p.) APE (p.p.)
Median 13.16 15.87 9.32 6.29 Median 8.52 11.97 3.61 0.35
Absolute Gain over AvgEff 6.55 9.58 Absolute Gain over AvgEff 8.35 11.62
Relative Gain over AvgEff (%) 41.27 60.38 Relative Gain over AvgEff (%) 69.81 97.05
RPE (%) RPE (%)
Median 12.33 15.03 8.98 5.77 Median 8.10 11.45 3.58 0.34
Absolute Gain over AvgEff 6.05 9.27 Absolute Gain over AvgEff 7.87 11.11
Relative Gain over AvgEff (%) 40.27 61.63 Relative Gain over AvgEff (%) 68.75 97.05
https://doi.org/10.1371/journal.pone.0227418.t007
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Overall, these results support the previous analysis. We also performed the analysis for sep-
arate values of γ. We used g ¼ 1n for n = 1, . . ., 30 yielding 360,000 mergers (4 demand systems
and 30 cost systems, for a total of 120 scenarios, each with 3,000 mergers). The results are
similar.
Conclusion
We investigate the accuracy of UPP as a tool in antitrust analysis by extending the standard
UPP formulation to include merger-specific cost efficiencies. We include cost efficiencies
in a tractable manner in the existing theoretical framework and derive the related UPP
formulations.
The efficacy of the new UPP formulations is analyzed using Monte Carlo simulation for 8
different scenarios; four demand systems (Logit, Linear, Log-Linear, and Almost ideal) and
two merger-specific, cost complementarity systems (Generalized Leontief and Quadratic). For
each scenario we simulate 5,000 mergers, for a total of 40,000 mergers.
We find that the new UPP formulations yield substantial gains in post-merger price predic-
tion and in merger screening accuracy. The results are robust to several additional analyses,
including using F1 score and allowing for more flexible merger-specific efficiencies. The
results show that including cost efficiencies in a manner guided by the theoretical model may
yield substantial improvements in accuracy of UPP as a tool in antitrust analysis.
Table 8. Improvement in merger screening accuracy—5% tolerance threshold.
CURVATURE—TOTAL ERRORS
Logit Demand NoEff AvgEff ModEff FOA Linear Demand NoEff AvgEff ModEff FOA
Type I error 0.577 0.190 0.042 0.005 Type I error 0.579 0.186 0.047 0.000
Type II error 0.020 0.089 0.019 0.005 Type II error 0.000 0.064 0.002 0.000
Total 0.596 0.279 0.061 0.010 Total 0.580 0.250 0.049 0.000
Absolute Gain over AvgEff 0.217 0.268 Absolute Gain over AvgEff 0.201 0.250
Relative Gain over AvgEff (%) 78.00 96.31 Relative Gain over AvgEff (%) 80.23 100.00
Log-Linear Demand NoEff AvgEff ModEff FOA Almost Ideal Demand NoEff AvgEff ModEff FOA
Type I error 0.325 0.085 0.021 0.075 Type I error 0.369 0.086 0.018 0.006
Type II error 0.021 0.237 0.216 0.062 Type II error 0.003 0.175 0.131 0.011
Total 0.346 0.322 0.237 0.137 Total 0.372 0.261 0.150 0.017
Absolute Gain over AvgEff 0.085 0.186 Absolute Gain over AvgEff 0.111 0.244
Relative Gain over AvgEff (%) 26.38 57.60 Relative Gain over AvgEff (%) 42.68 93.58
CURVATURE—F1 SCORE
Logit Demand NoEff AvgEff ModEff FOA Linear Demand NoEff AvgEff ModEff FOA
Precision Ratio 0.246 0.384 0.817 0.972 Precision Ratio 0.242 0.395 0.795 1.000
Recall Ratio 0.904 0.570 0.906 0.975 Recall Ratio 0.998 0.656 0.987 1.000
F1 score 0.386 0.459 0.859 0.974 F1 score 0.390 0.493 0.881 1.000
Absolute Gain over AvgEff 0.400 0.515 Absolute Gain over AvgEff 0.388 0.507
Relative Gain over AvgEff (%) 87.23 112.09 Relative Gain over AvgEff (%) 78.73 102.87
Log-Linear Demand NoEff AvgEff ModEff FOA Almost Ideal Demand NoEff AvgEff ModEff FOA
Precision Ratio 0.511 0.501 0.766 0.748 Precision Ratio 0.458 0.518 0.853 0.890
Recall Ratio 0.871 0.344 0.393 0.685 Recall Ratio 0.916 0.417 0.513 0.789
F1 score 0.644 0.408 0.520 0.715 F1 score 0.611 0.462 0.641 0.836
Absolute Gain over AvgEff 0.112 0.308 Absolute Gain over AvgEff 0.179 0.374
Relative Gain over AvgEff (%) 27.56 75.54 Relative Gain over AvgEff (%) 38.67 80.92
https://doi.org/10.1371/journal.pone.0227418.t008
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Supporting information
S1 Fig. Accuracy of prediction—Linear demand, Generalized Leontief cost. First row shows
the distribution of the true post merger prices against the predicted post merger prices using
different UPP calculations and own goods’ efficiencies included in the computation. Second
row shows the same for both goods’ efficiencies.
(TIF)
S2 Fig. Absolute prediction errors—Linear demand, Generalized Leontief cost. Portrays
density kernels for absolute prediction errors, as well as the median absolute prediction error,
first and third quartile for each specification.
(TIF)
S3 Fig. Relative prediction errors—Linear demand, Generalized Leontief cost. Portrays
density kernels for relative prediction errors, as well as the median relative prediction error,
first and third quartile for each specification.
(TIF)
S4 Fig. Accuracy of prediction—Log-linear demand, Generalized Leontief cost. First row
shows the distribution of the true post merger prices against the predicted post merger prices
Table 9. Baseline UPP with higher thresholds.
CURVATURE—TOTAL ERRORS
Logit Linear
UPPNoEff UPPModEff UPPFOA UPPNoEff UPPModEff UPPFOA
5% 10% 15% 0% 0% 5% 10% 15% 0% 0%
Type I error 0.577 0.467 0.322 0.001 0.011 Type I error 0.579 0.457 0.308 0.041 0.000
Type II error 0.020 0.015 0.011 0.036 0.002 Type II error 0.000 0.002 0.001 0.009 0.000
Total error 0.596 0.482 0.333 0.037 0.013 Total error 0.580 0.459 0.309 0.050 0.000
Log-Linear Almost Ideal
UPPNoEff UPPModEff UPPFOA UPPNoEff UPPModEff UPPFOA
5% 10% 15% 0% 0% 5% 10% 15% 0% 0%
Type I error 0.325 0.205 0.117 0.057 0.081 Type I error 0.369 0.248 0.136 0.052 0.008
Type II error 0.021 0.059 0.089 0.054 0.059 Type II error 0.003 0.017 0.031 0.037 0.011
Total error 0.346 0.265 0.206 0.111 0.141 Total error 0.372 0.265 0.168 0.089 0.019
CURVATURE—F1 SCORE
Logit Linear
UPPNoEff UPPModEff UPPFOA UPPNoEff UPPModEff UPPFOA
5% 10% 15% 0% 0% 5% 10% 15% 0% 0%
Precision Ratio 0.246 0.122 0.072 0.998 0.979 Precision Ratio 0.242 0.142 0.111 0.920 1.000
Recall Ratio 0.904 0.814 0.689 0.933 0.996 Recall Ratio 0.998 0.970 0.975 0.981 1.000
F1 score 0.386 0.212 0.131 0.964 0.987 F1 score 0.390 0.247 0.200 0.949 1.000
Log-Linear Almost Ideal
UPPNoEff UPPModEff UPPFOA UPPNoEff UPPModEff UPPFOA
5% 10% 15% 0% 0% 5% 10% 15% 0% 0%
Precision Ratio 0.511 0.475 0.443 0.832 0.799 Precision Ratio 0.458 0.406 0.404 0.863 0.929
Recall Ratio 0.871 0.712 0.546 0.730 0.716 Recall Ratio 0.916 0.821 0.707 0.751 0.804
F1 score 0.644 0.570 0.489 0.777 0.755 F1 score 0.611 0.543 0.514 0.803 0.862
Table shows the F1 scores and its components, as well as total errors, in merger screening for UPP baseline formulation (for 5, 10, and 15% tolerance threshold) when
compared to UPP with model-based efficiencies and first-order approximation (with a strict tolerance of 0% threshold).
https://doi.org/10.1371/journal.pone.0227418.t009
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using different UPP calculations and own goods’ efficiencies included in the computation. Sec-
ond row shows the same for both goods’ efficiencies.
(TIF)
S5 Fig. Absolute prediction errors—Log-linear demand, Generalized Leontief cost. Por-
trays density kernels for absolute prediction errors, as well as the median absolute prediction
error, first and third quartile for each specification.
(TIF)
S6 Fig. Relative prediction errors—Log-linear demand, Generalized Leontief cost. Portrays
density kernels for relative prediction errors, as well as the median relative prediction error,
first and third quartile for each specification.
(TIF)
S7 Fig. Accuracy of prediction—Almost ideal demand, Generalized Leontief cost. First row
shows the distribution of the true post merger prices against the predicted post merger prices
using different UPP calculations and own goods’ efficiencies included in the computation. Sec-
ond row shows the same for both goods’ efficiencies.
(TIF)
S8 Fig. Absolute prediction errors—Almost ideal demand, Generalized Leontief cost. Por-
trays density kernels for absolute prediction errors, as well as the median absolute prediction
error, first and third quartile for each specification.
(TIF)
S9 Fig. Relative prediction errors—Almost ideal demand, Generalized Leontief cost. Por-
trays density kernels for relative prediction errors, as well as the median relative prediction
error, first and third quartile for each specification.
(TIF)
S10 Fig. Accuracy of prediction—Logit demand, quadratic cost. First row shows the distri-
bution of the true post merger prices against the predicted post merger prices using different
UPP calculations and own goods’ efficiencies included in the computation. Second row shows
the same for both goods’ efficiencies.
(TIF)
S11 Fig. Absolute prediction errors—Logit demand, quadratic cost. Portrays density kernels
for absolute prediction errors, as well as the median absolute prediction error, first and third
quartile for each specification.
(TIF)
S12 Fig. Relative prediction errors—Logit demand, quadratic cost. Portrays density kernels
for relative prediction errors, as well as the median relative prediction error, first and third
quartile for each specification.
(TIF)
S13 Fig. Accuracy of prediction—Linear demand, quadratic cost. First row shows the distri-
bution of the true post merger prices against the predicted post merger prices using different
UPP calculations and own goods’ efficiencies included in the computation. Second row shows
the same for both goods’ efficiencies.
(TIF)
S14 Fig. Absolute prediction errors—Linear demand, quadratic cost. Portrays density ker-
nels for absolute prediction errors, as well as the median absolute prediction error, first and
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third quartile for each specification.
(TIF)
S15 Fig. Relative prediction errors—Linear demand, quadratic cost. Portrays density ker-
nels for relative prediction errors, as well as the median relative prediction error, first and
third quartile for each specification.
(TIF)
S16 Fig. Accuracy of prediction—Log-linear demand, quadratic cost. First row shows the
distribution of the true post merger prices against the predicted post merger prices using dif-
ferent UPP calculations and own goods’ efficiencies included in the computation. Second row
shows the same for both goods’ efficiencies.
(TIF)
S17 Fig. Absolute prediction errors—Log-linear demand, quadratic cost. Portrays density
kernels for absolute prediction errors, as well as the median absolute prediction error, first and
third quartile for each specification.
(TIF)
S18 Fig. Relative prediction errors—Log-linear demand, quadratic cost. Portrays density
kernels for relative prediction errors, as well as the median relative prediction error, first and
third quartile for each specification.
(TIF)
S19 Fig. Accuracy of prediction—Almost ideal demand, quadratic cost. First row shows the
distribution of the true post merger prices against the predicted post merger prices using dif-
ferent UPP calculations and own goods’ efficiencies included in the computation. Second row
shows the same for both goods’ efficiencies.
(TIF)
S20 Fig. Absolute prediction errors—Almost ideal demand, quadratic cost. Portrays density
kernels for absolute prediction errors, as well as the median absolute prediction error, first and
third quartile for each specification.
(TIF)
S21 Fig. Relative prediction errors—Almost ideal demand, quadratic cost. Portrays density
kernels for relative prediction errors, as well as the median relative prediction error, first and
third quartile for each specification.
(TIF)
S1 Dataset. Monte Carlo dataset.
(CSV)
S1 Table. Improvement in merger screening accuracy—10% tolerance threshold.
(PDF)
S2 Table. Improvement in merger screening accuracy—0% tolerance threshold.
(PDF)
S3 Table. Improvement in merger screening accuracy—10% tolerance threshold.
(PDF)
S4 Table. Improvement in merger screening accuracy—0% tolerance threshold.
(PDF)
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S5 Table. Improvement in merger screening accuracy—10% tolerance threshold.
(PDF)
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Writing – review & editing: Jéssica Dutra, Tarun Sabarwal.
References
1. Farrell J, Shapiro C. Antitrust evaluation of horizontal mergers: An economic alternative to market defi-
nition. The BE Journal of Theoretical Economics. 2010; 10(1).
2. Jaffe S, Weyl EG. The first-order approach to merger analysis. American Economic Journal: Microeco-
nomics. 2013; 5(4):188–218.
3. Buccirossi P. Handbook of Antitrust Economics. MIT Press; 2008.
4. Ivaldi M, Jullien B, Rey P, Seabright P, Tirole J. The economics of unilateral effects. Interim report for
DG competition, European Commission. 2003.
5. Werden GJ. Unilateral competitive effects of horizontal mergers I: Basic concepts and models. Issues
in Competition Law and Policy. 2010.
6. Shapiro C. The 2010 horizontal merger guidelines: From hedgehog to fox in forty years. Antitrust Law
Journal. 2010; 77(1):49–107.
7. Werden GJ, Froeb LM. The effects of mergers in differentiated products industries: Logit demand and
merger policy. Journal of Law, Economics, & Organization. 1994; 10(2):407–426.
8. Werden GJ, Froeb LM. Simulation as an alternative to structural merger policy in differentiated products
industries. In: The Economics of the Antitrust Process, Topics in Regulatory Economics and Policy
Series. Springer; 1996.
9. Hausman JA, Leonard GK. Economic analysis of differentiated products mergers using real world data.
Geo Mason L Rev. 1996; 5:321–343.
10. Berry S, Pakes A. Some applications and limitations of recent advances in empirical industrial organiza-
tion: Merger analysis. The American Economic Review. 1993; 83(2):247–252.
11. Epstein RJ, Rubinfeld DL. Merger simulation: A simplified approach with new applications. Antitrust
Law Journal. 2001; 69:883–919.
12. Werden GJ, Froeb LM, Scheffman DT. A Daubert discipline for merger simulation. Antitrust. 2003;
18:89–95.
13. Weinberg MC, Hosken D. Evidence on the accuracy of merger simulations. Review of Economics and
Statistics. 2013; 95(5):1584–1600. https://doi.org/10.1162/REST_a_00347
Antitrust analysis with upward pricing pressure and cost efficiencies
PLOS ONE | https://doi.org/10.1371/journal.pone.0227418 January 8, 2020 29 / 31
14. Budzinski O, Ruhmer I. Merger simulation in competition policy: A survey. Journal of Competition Law &
Economics. 2009; 6(2):277–319. https://doi.org/10.1093/joclec/nhp014
15. Schmalensee R. Should new merger guidelines give UPP market definition? CPI Antitrust Chronicle.
2009; 12(1):1–7.
16. Farrell J, Shapiro C. Upward Pricing Pressure and critical loss analysis: Response. Antitrust Chronicle.
2011; 1:1–17.
17. Werden GJ. A robust test for consumer welfare enhancing mergers among sellers of differentiated
products. The Journal of Industrial Economics. 1996; 44(4):409–413. https://doi.org/10.2307/
2950522
18. Willig R. Unilateral competitive effects of mergers: Upward Pricing Pressure, product quality, and other
extensions. Review of Industrial Organization. 2011; 39(1-2):19–38. https://doi.org/10.1007/s11151-
011-9307-7
19. Moresi S, Salop SC. vGUPPI: Scoring unilateral pricing incentives in vertical mergers. Antitrust Law
Journal. 2013; 79:185–214.
20. Miller NH, Remer M, Ryan C, Sheu G. On the first order approximation of counterfactual price effects in
oligopoly models, Working Paper. 2013.
21. Hausman J, Leonard G, Zona JD. Competitive analysis with differenciated products. Annales d’Econo-
mie et de Statistique. 1994;(34):159–180. https://doi.org/10.2307/20075951
22. Nevo A. Mergers with differentiated products: The case of the ready-to-eat cereal industry. The RAND
Journal of Economics. 2000; 31(3):395–421.
23. Miller NH, Remer M, Ryan C, Sheu G. Pass-Through and the Prediction of Merger Price Effects. The
Journal of Industrial Economics. 2016; 64(4):683–709. https://doi.org/10.1111/joie.12131
24. Cheung L. An Empirical Comparison Between the Upward Pricing Pressure Test and Merger Simulation
in Differentiated Product Markets. Journal of Competition Law & Economics. 2016; 12(4):701–734.
https://doi.org/10.1093/joclec/nhw026
25. Garmon C. The accuracy of hospital merger screening methods. The RAND Journal of Economics.
2017; 48(4):1068–1102. https://doi.org/10.1111/1756-2171.12215
26. Miller NH, Remer M, Ryan C, Sheu G. Upward Pricing Pressure as a predictor of merger price effects.
International Journal of Industrial Organization. 2017; 52:216–247. https://doi.org/10.1016/j.ijindorg.
2017.01.010
27. Gifford DJ, Kudrle RT. The Atlantic Divide in Antitrust: An Examination of US and EU Competition Pol-
icy. University of Chicago Press; 2015.
28. Kinne K. Efficiencies in merger analysis. Intereconomics. 1999; 34(6):297–302. https://doi.org/10.1007/
BF02929896
29. Crane DA. Rethinking Merger Efficiencies. Michigan Law Review. 2011; 110(3):347–391.
30. Farrell J, Shapiro C. Scale economies and synergies in horizontal merger analysis. Antitrust Law Jour-
nal. 2001; 68(3):685–710.
31. Deneckere R, Davidson C. Incentives to form coalitions with Bertrand competition. The RAND Journal
of Economics. 1985; 16(4):473–486.
32. Warren-Boulton FR. Merger Policy and Enforcement at the Antitrust Division: The Economist’s View.
Antitrust Law Journal. 1985; 54:109–115.
33. Simons JJ, Coate MB. Upward Pressure on Price analysis: issues and implications for merger policy.
European Competition Journal. 2010; 6(2):377–396. https://doi.org/10.5235/174410510792283745
34. Pardo-Garcia C, Sempere-Monerris JJ. Equilibrium mergers in a composite good industry with efficien-
cies. SERIEs. 2015; 6(1):101–127. https://doi.org/10.1007/s13209-014-0121-y
35. Miller NH, Remer M, Sheu G. Using cost pass-through to calibrate demand. Economics Letters. 2013;
118(3):451–454. https://doi.org/10.1016/j.econlet.2012.12.021
36. Li T, Rosenman R. Estimating hospital costs with a generalized Leontief function. Health Economics.
2001; 10(6):523–538. https://doi.org/10.1002/hec.605 PMID: 11550293
37. Cohn E, Rhine SL, Santos MC. Institutions of higher education as multi-product firms: Economies of
scale and scope. The Review of Economics and Statistics. 1989; 71(2):284–290. https://doi.org/10.
2307/1926974
38. Martı́nez-Budrı́a E, Jara-Dı́az S, Ramos-Real FJ. Adapting productivity theory to the quadratic cost
function. An application to the Spanish electric sector. Journal of Productivity Analysis. 2003; 20
(2):213–229. https://doi.org/10.1023/A:1025184306832
39. Diewert WE. An application of the Shephard duality theorem: A generalized Leontief production func-
tion. Journal of Political Economy. 1971; 79(3):481–507. https://doi.org/10.1086/259764
Antitrust analysis with upward pricing pressure and cost efficiencies
PLOS ONE | https://doi.org/10.1371/journal.pone.0227418 January 8, 2020 30 / 31
40. Hall RE. The specification of technology with several kinds of output. Journal of Political Economy.
1973; 81(4):878–892. https://doi.org/10.1086/260086
41. Caves DW, Christensen LR, Tretheway MW. Flexible cost functions for multiproduct firms. The Review
of Economics and Statistics. 1980; 62(3):477–481. https://doi.org/10.2307/1927120
42. Taragin C, Sandfort M. Tools for Antitrust Practitioners. 2019.
43. Björnerstedt J, Verboven F. Merger simulation with nested Logit demand. The Stata Journal. 2014; 14
(3):511–540. https://doi.org/10.1177/1536867X1401400304
44. Coate MB. Benchmarking The Upward Pricing Pressure Model with Federal Trade Commission Evi-
dence. Journal of Competition Law & Economics. 2011; 7(4):825–846. https://doi.org/10.1093/joclec/
nhr014
Antitrust analysis with upward pricing pressure and cost efficiencies
PLOS ONE | https://doi.org/10.1371/journal.pone.0227418 January 8, 2020 31 / 31
